On March 1, a group of Uighurs from Xinjiang attacked the Kunming train station in southwest China using foot-long knives, killing 29 and injuring 143. The terror attack, popularly referred to as “China’s 9/11,” is a spillover from Xinjiang’s internal conflict.
By Kendrick Kuo
March 28, 2014,
On March 1, a group of Uighurs from Xinjiang attacked the Kunming train station in southwest China using foot-long knives, killing 29 and injuring 143. The terror attack, popularly referred to as “China’s 9/11,” is a spillover from Xinjiang’s internal conflict. Since being “liberated” by Chinese Communists in 1949, the region has experienced sporadic episodes of significant violence between Uighurs, the dominant ethnic group in the region, and Han Chinese. The source of conflict is disputed—the Chinese narrative emphasizes external, separatist and jihadist influences, whereas Western analysts tend to focus on Uighur grievances toward discriminatory government policies.
China’s narrative regarding the conflict changed abruptly and considerably following the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, on New York and Washington. Ten days before, the Xinjiang party chief and government leader had declared that Xinjiang was “not a place of terror.” Soon after Sept. 11, however, Chinese officials began claiming that Uighur separatists had ties with international terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is the jihadist group most often claimed to be involved in Xinjiang, with alleged ties to al-Qaida, though ETIM’s very existence is disputed. Chinese authorities have aggressively restricted religious freedom and launched “strike hard” campaigns in Xinjiang to crack down on separatists.
In addition to maintaining iron-fisted rule for much of the decade after 2001, Beijing has encouraged Han immigration to Xinjiang, importing to the region both skillsets and loyalty. Immigration is designed to fuel development and thereby create stability. Currently, Xinjiang is home to more than 8 million Han immigrants, representing about 39 percent of its population. Ironically, many Han Chinese in Xinjiang feel that the government commits reverse discrimination in the form of state policies that favor Uighurs in family planning and affirmative action, which creates friction between the Han and Uighur communities. While Uighurs do receive government-sponsored benefits, they consider their religion—Islam—and language to be under threat. The government places restrictions on religious freedom by setting minimum ages for mosque attendance, prohibiting the learning of Arabic and pressuring Uighurs not to fast during Ramadan. Uighurs learn Mandarin Chinese to participate in the economy, but the necessity of doing so is also viewed as an attack on the transmission of Uighur culture to the next generation. Despite Xinjiang’s economic growth, Uighurs are still disproportionately represented among the low-income stratum, with most jobs going to Han.
In July 2009, demonstrations in the provincial capital, Urumqi, turned violent, as Uighur demonstrators clashed with Han and police. The Urumqi riots, as they became known, proved to be an important turning point in Xinjiang’s recent history. Uighur demonstrators had called for the Chinese government to fully investigate the murder of two Uighurs in a Guangdong factory brawl, itself triggered by the rumored rape of two Han women by six Uighur men a few days earlier. Chinese authorities, however, claimed the riots were orchestrated by Uighur exile leader Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uighur Congress (WUC), which Beijing considers a terror-sponsoring organization fomenting unrest in Xinjiang. Other important Uighur diaspora communities include the Uighur American Association and groups in Australia and Canada. From Beijing’s perspective, the fact that Western countries host and sponsor these exiled communities demonstrates a desire to destabilize China.
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of July 2009, Beijing dismissed Xinjiang party chief Wang Lequan and replaced him with Zhang Chunxian, a populist politician who promised to replace “pure iron-fisted rule” with “flexible iron-fisted rule” and shift the government’s policy focus from “stability maintenance” to economic development as the solution to the region’s instability. The renewed emphasis on Xinjiang’s economic development was illustrated by the 2010 Xinjiang Work Forum, which crafted an assistance plan pairing Xinjiang with 19 other provinces and municipalities, as well as pairing various state-owned enterprises with different parts of Xinjiang.
Along with aggressive security measures and Zhang’s development initiatives, China has a third, international approach to bringing stability to Xinjiang. Under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China is developing economic relations with Central Asian states to foster Xinjiang’s development. Beijing describes its host of economic initiatives in trade and energy as part of a broader New Silk Road policy. Politically, SCO members agree to combat the “three evils” of separatism, religious extremism and international terrorism. Operationally, the SCO houses the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, which facilitates intelligence-sharing. China also conducts joint military counterterrorism exercises, which have been criticized for using scenarios and tactics that address mass uprisings rather than terrorist insurgencies.
Despite Beijing’s attempts to bring order to Xinjiang, the summers of 2012 and 2013 were rife with violent attacks on police and mass demonstrations. In October 2013, a vehicle carrying three Uighurs drove through a crowded sidewalk and burst into flames in front of Mao’s portrait in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. The fire was reported as a terrorist attack, the first one conducted by Uighurs outside of Xinjiang. The fear of a widening scope of attacks outside Xinjiang found confirmation in the Kunming incident in March.
On March 7, days after the Kunming attack, the Xinjiang party secretary announced that security efforts would from now on be conducted through the newly formed National Security Commission, which under President Xi Jinping’s leadership is accruing authority over foreign and domestic elements of national security. As Xi makes security policies and enforcement more efficient, Xinjiang will feel the immediate effects.
Xinjiang government officials have also announced they are considering implementing regional counterterrorism laws. China traditionally prosecutes terrorists under its criminal law, though national counterterrorism laws have been discussed for almost a decade. While the criminal law’s punishments are deterrents, counterterrorism laws would authorize preventive measures. New counterterrorism laws may provide more accountability in the legal prosecution of terrorists, but at the same time legalize and streamline harsher security policies that are gaining support among a fearful Chinese public.
Beijing’s Xinjiang policies have demonstrated a degree of flexibility over time to face different challenges both international and domestic, coalescing around two broad imperatives: stabilize and develop. Yet it is hard to imagine any mix of the two bringing a satisfactory resolution, meaning that Xinjiang’s civil strife will in all likelihood remain intractable.
Kendrick Kuo is pursuing graduate studies at Johns Hopkins SAIS, where his research focuses on Chinese continentalism. He is a contributor at the Diplomat and Registan.
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