For over a decade, academics and policymakers have been engaged in an unusually public and at times ad hominem debate over the future direction of China\u2019s ethnic policies.<\/p>\n
Publication: China Brief Volume: 14 Issue: 21
November 7, 2014 12:50 PM Age: 5 hrs
By: James Leibold<\/p>\n
For over a decade, academics and policymakers have been engaged in an unusually public and at times ad hominem<\/em> debate over the future direction of China\u2019s ethnic policies. [1]<\/strong> A group of maverick Chinese thinkers claim current policies engender disunity and could cause China to implode along its ethnic seams. Many others contend China\u2019s diversity is its greatest strength and call for new legal provisions aimed at protecting ethnic cultures, autonomy and identities. The stakes have increased markedly since Chinese President Xi Jinping took power in November 2013, with hundreds of violent incidents revealing obvious fault-lines in ethnic relations across the country.<\/p>\n The recently convened Central Ethnic Work Conference sought to resolve this disagreement: \u201cto unite thinking, clarify tasks and objectives and steady confidence and resolve\u201d (Xinhua, September 29). The two-day meeting was chaired by Xi Jinping and attended by the entire Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) (with the exception of Zhang Gaoli, who was overseas) and over a thousand other leaders in Beijing on September 28\u201329. The meeting received extensive coverage in the Chinese state-run media, including four front-page editorials in the People\u2019s Daily<\/em>, yet virtually no attention in the international media.<\/p>\n In his speech at the conference, Xi stressed the need to \u201cresolutely walk the correct road of China\u2019s unique solution to the ethnic question.\u201d He spoke for the first time about adhering to the \u201ceight persistences\u201d (bage jianchi<\/em>)\u2014a typically awkward formulation that seeks to juggle contradictory positions within China\u2019s ethnic policy community by placing minority autonomy side-by-side with safeguarding the unity of the motherland (Qiushi<\/em>, October 13). [2]<\/strong> As such, the meeting produced some subtle rhetorical adjustments while failing to bridge the differences in opinion or pioneer any bold new direction in policy. In fact, both sides in the debate are already using Xi\u2019s speech to advance their own positions.<\/p>\n Xi Put His Own Stamp on Ethnic Work<\/strong><\/p>\n On the evening of September 29, the People\u2019s Daily<\/em> broke the news of this important gathering on its official Weixin social-media account with a post entitled: \u201cXi Jinping\u2019s \u2018Fresh Thinking\u2019 on Ethnic Work\u201d (NetEase, September 29). The report highlighted several \u201ccompletely new angles\u201d emerging from this Party confab; yet it incorrectly identified the meeting as the third Central Ethnic Work Conference, mentioning the two gatherings convened by former Chinese president Jiang Zemin in 1992 and 1999 but omitting the last conference held in 2005 under the leadership of Xi\u2019s predecessor, former Chinese president Hu Jintao (Xinhua, May 27, 2005). [3]<\/strong><\/p>\n The oversight appears to have been accidental, with subsequent reports including Hu\u2019s conference. However, it does highlight Xi\u2019s determination to put forward his own formula for achieving ethnic harmony. Like other policy areas, he has staked his personal authority on the management of this contentious and sensitive policy arena. In the face of the current spate of ethnic violence\u2014which reached the political center in October 2012 when a gasoline-laden car exploded in front of the Forbidden City in Beijing\u2014Xi wants to look strong and decisive on ethnic issues.<\/p>\n In his first two years in office, Xi Jinping has chaired no fewer than eight gatherings of the Politburo or PBSC on ethnic work, including this May\u2019s Second Central Work Forum on Xinjiang (China Brief<\/em>, June 19), while also personally touring ethnic minority communities in Gansu (February 2013), western Hunan (November 2013), Inner Mongolia (January 2014) and Xinjiang (April 2014). The State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) has even created a special website to highlight Xi and other PBSC members\u2019 activities on ethnic affairs (SEAC).<\/p>\n For all of the Party\u2019s public emphasis on their efforts, none of Xi\u2019s speeches on ethnic policy have been made public. The official Xinhua New Agency provides summaries of key meetings as well as select excerpts, leaving analysts to piece together a range of inconsistent and often divergent messages. Xinhua\u2019s summary of the recent Central Ethnic Work Conference is a consensus document: one that pastes over deep divisions on how best to end the current cycle of violence and engender harmonious ethnic relations.<\/p>\n Carefully Walking the Chinese Road<\/strong><\/p>\n In his speech, Xi Jinping stressed the need for patience and confidence with the current approach. Like previous pronouncements, the conference affirmed the \u201ccorrectness\u201d of the Chinese Communist Party\u2019s (CCP) ethnic theory and policies since 1949. \u201cEthnic relations in our country are generally harmonious,\u201d Xi is quoted as saying, \u201cand our country\u2019s ethnic work has been successful\u201d (Xinhua, September 29). Yet, the conference summary also speaks about the \u201cdistinctive features\u201d of ethnic work in a \u201cnew stage.\u201d On the one hand, the Party must \u201cunflinchingly walk the correct road of China\u2019s unique solution to the ethnic question,\u201d yet also \u201cpioneer new thinking\u201d and \u201cforge new methods.\u201d This reflects the Party\u2019s never-ending quest to adapt outdated policies to new conditions without abandoning outright their predecessors\u2019 policies and pet-slogans.<\/p>\n Much of the ethnic policy debate has revolved around the most appropriate models for China. Critics of current policies, like Peking University sociologist Ma Rong and Tsinghua University economist Hu Angang, argue China\u2019s Soviet-inspired policies possess all the preconditions for state disintegration (strong ethnic consciousness, ethnic homelands in the form of autonomous regions and ethnic leadership), thus creating the possibility that China will share the fate of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.<\/p>\n These reformers call for the abandonment of the current \u201chors d\u2019oeuvres-style\u201d policies and the adoption of the \u201cmelting pot\u201d model that has proven successful, in their eyes, in countries like the United States, India, Brazil and Singapore. They make it clear that they would like to see a \u201cweakening\u201d (danhua<\/em>) of ethnic identity and the eventual elimination of ethnic-based preferences and the system of regional ethnic autonomy. Ma Rong recently referred to regional autonomy as \u201ca viable option for a period of transition, but in the long run it has certain weaknesses\u201d (Asian Ethnicity<\/em>, January 9). And one of the Party\u2019s top ethnic policy advisors, Zhu Weiqun, recently hinted there might come a day when the system outgrows its usefulness (Xinhua, July 28).<\/p>\n Yet, as recent events in Ferguson, Missouri, demonstrate, the melting pot has failed to eliminate ethnic problems in countries like United States, a point that Hao Shiyuan, the influential deputy secretary general of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), has long stressed in opposition to the reformers (Global Times<\/em>, August 22, 2012). Hao and other members of the ethnic establishment are already talking up the fact that the system of regional ethnic autonomy was included amongst Xi\u2019s eight persistencies (Xinhua, September 30; Xinhua, October 23).<\/p>\n According to the \u201cguiding document\u201d (ganglingxing wenxian<\/em>) the SEAC issued for studying Xi\u2019s conference speech, \u201cWestern countries have not developed any miraculous cure in their attempt to solve ethnic problems, and some developing countries have also failed to solve the ethnic problems after imitating the West\u201d (Qiushi<\/em>, October 16). The document paraphrases Xi as stating the system of regional ethnic autonomy exceeds not only the Soviet model of \u201cnational self-determination\u201d but also previous Chinese approaches such as \u201cthe grand union\u201d (dayitong<\/em>) and \u201crule according to customs\u201d (yinsu erzhi<\/em>), and thus forms a fundamental part of the Party\u2019s innovative and pioneering approach to ethnic contradictions.<\/p>\n The SEAC document, written by its director, Wang Zhengwei, admits a loss of confidence in the current approach among some Party members and differences of opinion. He refers to Xi\u2019s speech as a \u201csummary determination offering the final word\u201d on this disagreement, and a \u201clofty judgment\u201d aimed at \u201cclearing up muddled thinking and providing a tranquilizer for the cadres and masses of each ethnic group so they can sturdy the foundation of ethnic unity and progress.\u201d Wang flatly declares: \u201cIt\u2019s time to stop suggesting that the system of ethnic autonomy should be abolished!\u201d Rather, everyone should \u201cconsolidate their energies in order to carry out their work effectively\u201d while \u201cstrengthening confidence in our own road\u201d (Qiushi<\/em>, October 16). <\/p>\n Yet, as another editorial in Qiushi<\/em> noted after the meeting (Qiushi<\/em>, October 13), Xi also spoke about the importance of the \u201ctwo integrations\u201d when it comes to \u201cpersisting and perfecting\u201d the system of regional ethnic autonomy: the mutual link between autonomy and unity, as well as ethnic and regional factors. Here Xi seems to validate the concerns of those who argue regional autonomy and minority preferences hinder the free flow of capital, goods and people, thus undermining a single national market and shared national identity. Xi\u2019s speech leaves open the possibility of a future restructuring of provincial-level administrative structures, as recommended in Hu Angang\u2019s call for a \u201csecond generation of ethnic policies\u201d (China Brief<\/em>, July 6, 2012). Some influential Party members have argued in the past, for example, that Xinjiang and Tibet should be divided in two in order to dilute ethnic influences and conflicts (Aisixiang, April 15, 2004).<\/p>\n In the Spirit of Unity<\/strong><\/p>\n Unlike his immediate predecessors\u2019 narrow focus on economic development for improving ethnic relations, Xi Jinping is harking back to Maoist and Republican times in emphasizing the \u201cspiritual,\u201d \u201cpolitical,\u201d and \u201ccultural\u201d basis of interethnic harmony and national unity. \u201cCultural identity,\u201d Xi is quoted as saying at the Central Ethnic Work Conference, \u201cis the foundation and long-term basis for strengthening the great unity of the Chinese nation; we must build a shared spiritual homeland and energetically foster a shared consciousness of the Chinese nation\u201d (Xinhua, October 9).<\/p>\n The conference affirmed the need to accelerate development in ethnic areas with a special focus on addressing livelihood issues such as employment and education. At the same time, Xi stressed that these \u201cmaterial\u201d concerns need to be complemented with a new focus on \u201cspiritual\u201d issues. Some minority cadres interpret this as paying closer attention to the religious needs of ethnic minorities (Xinhua, October 23); yet, there is clear evidence that Xi Jinping shares the concerns of Ma Rong and others about the weak identification of some ethnic minorities toward the nation. National identity, Xi has often made clear, should always trump narrow religious and ethnic affiliations.<\/p>\n Since coming to power, Xi Jinping and other PBSC members have spoken repeatedly of the need to strengthen the \u201cfour identifications\u201d (sige rentong<\/em>)\u2014identification with the motherland; the Chinese nation; Chinese culture; and the socialist road with Chinese characteristics\u2014among the ethnic minorities. This theme again featured prominently at the conference and marks a significant departure from Hu Jintao\u2019s approach to ethnic work. Economic development is no panacea for ethnic problems, CASS researcher Ma Dazheng told Xinhua. Rather, interethnic \u201cmingling\u201d (jiaorong<\/em>) is also required to forge a collective sense of national belonging (Xinhua, October 23).<\/p>\n In fact, interethnic \u201ccontact, exchange and mingling\u201d has emerged as the new \u201cguiding principal\u201d (tifa<\/em>) for ethnic work under Xi Jinping. Recent Chinese media reports highlight efforts to boost interethnic marriage rates, build mix-residency communities, establish integrated schools and classrooms, as well as more diverse workplaces through export-labour schemes that lure Uyghurs and Tibetans to work alongside their Han compatriots in coastal cities (People\u2019s Daily<\/em>, September 2; Tianshan, September 14; Xinhua, September 15; Southern Daily, October 30).<\/p>\n China\u2019s history, Xi argued in a 2011 speech on the importance of studying Chinese history, reveals a continual process of interethnic mingling and fusion in the pursuit of a \u201call-under-heaven grand harmony\u201d (tianxia datong<\/em>) (Phoenix, September 5, 2011). Zhu Weiqun, the Director of the CPPCC\u2019s Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee, recently quoted former Chinese premier Zhou Enlai as saying in 1957: \u201cIf assimilation is one ethnic group using force to destroy another ethnic group, this is reactionary; yet if assimilation is each ethnic group naturally fusing together in search of common prosperity, this is progress\u201d (Xinhua, July 28). \u201cMingling is not Hanification,\u201d a Xinhua editorial asserts, \u201cas it does not negate minority history and culture\u201d (Xinhua, September 16).<\/p>\n At the Central Ethnic Work Conference, the goal of ethnic blending was coupled with \u201crespect for differences and tolerance of diversity,\u201d revealing again this attempt to balance competing concerns. There is a growing realization that mingling might increase ethnic tensions and conflict, especially in cities, and thus the importance of \u201curban ethnic work\u201d was accentuated, with the conference calling on city officials to adopt neither a \u201cclose-door mentality\u201d nor a \u201claissez-faire attitude\u201d toward the minority floating population (Xinhua, September 29).<\/p>\n All in the Family?<\/strong><\/p>\n As elsewhere, the family is a frequent metaphor for the nation in China. \u201cThe relationship between the Chinese nation and each ethnic group is like that of a large family and its members,\u201d Xi told the conference, \u201cand relations between different ethnic groups is like those of different members of this large family.\u201d While kinfolk might disagree or even fight from time-to-time, they share a common bond in history and blood, rendering them a \u201ccommunity of shared destiny\u201d (mingyun gongtongti<\/em>), according to a front-page editorial in the Party\u2019s mouthpiece (People\u2019s Daily<\/em>, October 10). \u201cThrough the long revolutionary struggle and resistance to outside invasion, the blood of each ethnic group has come together and fused in bonds of life and death, flesh and blood, weal and woe, so they are now reflected in the collective belonging and identification of all ethnic groups with the Chinese nation\u201d (Qiushi<\/em>, July 31).<\/p>\n Yet like an internal family feud, the ethnic policy debate will continue in the wake of the Central Ethnic Work Conference, with both sides finding new ground to push forward their positions. Reformers will likely look for more concrete proposals to spur mingling and cultural fusion: the removal of administrative barriers and new initiatives aimed at increasing interethnic mobility, marriage, schooling and cohabitation. They will likely seek to use adjustments to the household registration system, legal and administrative reforms and the state\u2019s ambitious urbanization plan as springboards for building national cohesion and weakening minority autonomy and identity.<\/p>\n At the same time, those inside the vast ethnic bureaucracy will continue to rally around the system of regional ethnic autonomy, which is a formidable obstacle to any attempt to implement a \u201csecond generation of ethnic policies.\u201d Yet, they are unlikely to gain any ground on their call for the passage of more detailed regulations and rules for implementing and strengthening regional autonomy. In an article celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy, Wang Zhengwei pointed out \u201cthe fundamental aim [of the system] is to achieve and safeguard state uniformity and national unity\u201d (People\u2019s Daily<\/em>, September 3).<\/p>\n Both sides agree the \u201cChinese family\u201d must remain united. And while they will continue to probe the effectiveness of current policies, few dare question the Party\u2019s authority. As clan patriarch, the Party remains the final arbitrator of who and what can be said on behalf of the nation, as the recent silencing of moderate Uyghur academic Ilham Tohti forcefully reminds us. The \u201cChina Dream\u201d is the collective dream of all Chinese people, Xi Jinping consistently stresses, meaning restive minorities and outspoken critics must ultimately yield before the motherland if China hopes to achieve the great revival of the Chinese nation and race by 2049.<\/p>\n Notes<\/strong><\/p>\n For over a decade, academics and policymakers have been engaged in an unusually public and at times ad hominem debate over the future direction of China\u2019s ethnic policies.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":1376,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"topic":[],"class_list":["post-1377","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1377","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1377"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1377\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1376"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1377"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1377"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1377"},{"taxonomy":"topic","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/topic?post=1377"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n