Aspiring to force an order of relations among nations in Asia that would center on China: This basic policy line of the administration of Chinese President Xi Jinping will most likely remain unchanged.<\/p>\n
Published : 2015-02-12 18:48<\/p>\n
Aspiring to force an order of relations among nations in Asia that would center on China: This basic policy line of the administration of Chinese President Xi Jinping will most likely remain unchanged.<\/p>\n
China\u2019s gross domestic product, which became the world\u2019s second largest by surpassing that of Japan five years ago, is now more than twice as much as Japan\u2019s overall output of goods and services.<\/p>\n
Facing up to China-related challenges is a key issue for the international community.<\/p>\n
In recent years, signs have emerged that the one-party dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party is fraying.<\/p>\n
A downtrend in China\u2019s economic growth \u2015 the foundation of the stability of the government \u2015 is remarkable. The growth rate in 2014 stood at a year-on-year 7.4 percent, a figure that falls below the growth target set by the government and is the lowest in 24 years.<\/p>\n
Riots and demonstrations to protest such problems as widening income disparities, abuse of power and destruction of the environment have reportedly numbered as many as 200,000 a year in China in recent years. And criticism of the Communist Party threatens to erupt among the populace because of such problems as increased joblessness and widening gaps between the rich and the poor.<\/p>\n
President Xi is keenly aware of this threat. To maintain dictatorial rule, his administration will probably intensify such iron-handed means as control over speech and thought as well as suppression of human rights activists, while stepping up efforts for sustainable economic growth.<\/p>\n
There can be no room for doubt, however, that the rule of force is bound to reach its limit.<\/p>\n
In the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in far northwestern China, clashes have frequently occurred between groups of Uighur Muslims, a minority rebelling against repression by the government, and security authorities. Several hundred Uighur are reported to have joined the extremist organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. There are fears that those returning to the region from ISIL may intensify terrorist activities in the region.<\/p>\n
And anti-Beijing moves such as the recent student demonstrations in Hong Kong seeking a democratic electoral system will likely continue.<\/p>\n
China\u2019s domestic political situation is far from stable.<\/p>\n
Under the circumstances, Xi\u2019s crackdown on corruption by high-ranking party officials has gained high public favor.<\/p>\n
Last year, Zhou Yongkang, a former Chinese Communist Party Standing Committee member backed by former President Jiang Zemin, as well as former associates of former President Hu Jintao and a former top-ranking officer of the military fell from grace one after another. It is unlikely that Xi would ease his antigraft drive.<\/p>\n
Noteworthy in this connection is that Xi\u2019s \u201canticorruption drive\u201d is part of a power struggle by Xi to consolidate his own power base by spreading the fear of \u201cenforcement of strict discipline\u201d in the party.<\/p>\n
Regarding Xi\u2019s power, U.S. President Barack Obama has commented that Xi has consolidated power \u201cfaster and more comprehensively than probably anybody since Deng Xiaoping,\u201d saying \u201cthere are dangers\u201d over how Xi deals with such issues as human rights. Indeed, Xi\u2019s \u201csteering politics by force\u201d is likely to become more apparent.<\/p>\n
With this year marking the \u201c70th anniversary of China\u2019s victory in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression,\u201d the Xi administration is set to stage patriotic campaigns in a bid to quell discontent among the public. Emphasizing the Communist Party\u2019s \u201chistoric achievements\u201d with much fanfare, Xi is expected to appeal for unity among the people for the cause of what he advocates as the \u201cgreat rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.\u201d<\/p>\n
Throughout history, there have been many cases in which politics spins out of control, excessively fomenting nationalism. This is a worrisome situation.<\/p>\n
China\u2019s maritime advance, which aims to expand China\u2019s sphere of influence and acquire natural resources, will likely accelerate.<\/p>\n
China\u2019s attempt to change the status quo through force, which defies a long-lasting international order, cannot be tolerated. Japan should use all possible means to continue monitoring the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture and its territorial waters.<\/p>\n
International tension also continues in the South China Sea. While continuing negotiations with the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations over a \u201ccode of conduct\u201d that would legally bind activities of the countries concerned in the South China Sea, China is turning rock reefs that it effectively controls in the sea into military bases.<\/p>\n
In the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, China is seeking to increase the number of strongholds the country can count on to expand its regional influence, through improvement of ports. Presently, it is even studying the feasibility of expanding into the Arctic Ocean and the Atlantic.<\/p>\n
China\u2019s military power, which supports Chinese maritime expansion, is being stepped up further. Last year, China\u2019s defense spending as reflected in the official figure alone reached a level three times that of Japan. Its defense spending is expected to markedly rise this year as well.<\/p>\n
Last year, Xi advocated an \u201cAsian security concept\u201d that would effectively remove the United States from the Asian regional security order. He also proposed to the United States that the two countries create a \u201cnew type of great-power relations,\u201d under which both countries would respect each other\u2019s \u201ccore interests\u201d such as territories.<\/p>\n
This is just a self-righteous assertion. China clearly aims to become a leader in Asia. It is only reasonable that such assertions have not won wide approval among the countries concerned.<\/p>\n
Obama, who maintains the U.S. line of a \u201cpivot to Asia,\u201d recognizes the importance of bilateral cooperation between the United States and China but has made clear the U.S. standpoint of maintaining its engagement with the region.<\/p>\n
The important point is that Japan and the United States, which have long shored up regional stability, take leadership in building a new regional order with China also assuming a constructive role.<\/p>\n
In the economic sphere, China aims to build a new international financial order through the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Japan and the United States should explore ways for a vast Chinese market and its ample financial strength to contribute to the stable growth of the world economy.<\/p>\n
In this connection, it is vital to establish the principle of \u201cthe rule of law.\u201d<\/p>\n
It is therefore crucial to attempt to resolve international disputes and problems on the basis of international law, make proper practices in commercial transactions the rule and ensure the freedom of navigation by making use of various occasions such as the summit talks of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which is set for November in the Philippines.<\/p>\n
The international community must make strenuous efforts in urging China to exercise self-restraint and cooperate with other countries, as a \u201cresponsible great power.\u201d<\/p>\n
The Yomiuri Shimbun<\/p>\n
(Asia News Network)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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