Another spate of violence this week raises questions about the situation in the region.<\/p>\n
By Michael Clarke
June 25, 2015 1:12 p.m. ET<\/p>\n
Up to 28 people were killed in an attack Tuesday by suspected Uighur militants on a police check-point in Kashgar, in the southwest of China\u2019s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. According a Radio Free Asia report, the attack began when a car sped through the checkpoint, injuring a traffic policeman. Two suspects leapt out of the vehicle and killed two other police officers with knives. The fighting continued until People\u2019s Armed Police arrived at the scene and shot and killed not only the suspected militants but also numerous bystanders.<\/p>\n
Major international media outlets carried the RFA report, but the Chinese media has remained largely silent. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lu Kang would not confirm it when questioned by reporters about the incident, but simply noted that if it in fact did take place, \u201cthe Chinese government has the responsibility to take resolute steps to stop these kinds of violent terror acts, to maintain peace and stability in Xinjiang.\u201d<\/p>\n
While the exact circumstances surrounding this incident remain unclear, Beijing is facing escalating unrest in Xinjiang. In March, the Xinjiang regional government claimed that law enforcement agencies had \u201cbusted\u201d more than \u201c180 terrorist gangs\u201d in Xinjiang during the previous year. According to data compiled by Marc Julienne and Moritz Rudolf of the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin, terrorist attacks either in Xinjiang or linked to the region (such as the Kunming mass stabbing of March 1, 2014) have claimed the lives of 468 people and injured 548 between 2010 and 2014. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research in its annual Global Conflict Barometer report also categorized the situation in Xinjiang as one of \u201climited war.\u201d<\/p>\n
Is China thus facing an insurgency by Uighur militants in Xinjiang? According to RAND counterterrorism analyst Seth Jones, insurgency is \u201ca protracted political-military activity directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government and completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.\u201d Within those parameters the situation in Xinjiang arguably does not constitute an insurgency, as there is little evidence of a politically or ideologically coherent organization behind the escalating violence, or that attackers are seeking to control territory.<\/p>\n
However, an analysis of Beijing\u2019s measures in response to the escalating violence suggests that it is guided by a judgment that it faces the potential for an insurgency. Beijing\u2019s response to date has focused on three fronts: strengthening of security and counterterrorism measures; renewed attempts to strengthen \u201cstability\u201d and \u201cethnic unity;\u201d and a renewed effort to demonstrate the links between Uighur \u201cterrorism\u201d and \u201chostile external forces.\u201d<\/p>\n
On the first issue, Beijing rapidly increased Xinjiang\u2019s internal security budget to some $1 billion at the beginning of 2014, while President Xi Xinping has instituted a special committee on China\u2019s new National Security Council to specifically deal with security and counterterrorism strategies in Xinjiang.<\/p>\n
The authorities have also ramped up repressive measures in the region, with Xinjiang CCP Chairman Zhang Chuxian calling for a \u201cpeople\u2019s war\u201d in which the state will \u201cexterminate\u201d the \u201csavage and evil separatists\u201d who are influenced and directed by foreign \u201cextremists.\u201d<\/p>\n
This has entailed not only accelerated arrests and trials of suspected \u201cterrorists\u201d\u2014including public, mass sentencing rallies of Uighur suspects\u2014but also continued sweeps of Uighur neighborhoods and mosques in search of potential militants and their weapons. Furthermore, there is continued suspicion, and control of, outward signs of religiosity such as mosque attendance and wearing of veils.<\/p>\n
Along with using such \u201chard\u201d measures, authorities in Xinjiang have embarked upon less repressive ones to explicitly weaken Islam. There are reports of county-level regulations in southern Xinjiang that compel shop owners to stock both alcohol and cigarettes and advertise them through \u201ceye-catching displays.\u201d Authorities have also attempted to elicit the assistance of ordinary Uighurs in apprehending suspected militants through the offer of financial rewards for \u201ctip-offs\u201d to police regarding suspicious individuals and activities.<\/p>\n
Such strategies, however, miss a central element of an effective counterinsurgency strategy. As Mr. Jones notes, \u201cPopular support is a common goal for all actors in an insurgency. Both winning support and preventing insurgents from gaining support are critical components of any counterinsurgency.\u201d Beijing\u2019s focus on hard repressive measures and its antireligious campaigns seems destined to generate greater disaffection amongst Uighurs and increase the number of individuals who could potentially be coaxed into undertaking violent actions against the state.<\/p>\n
Mr. Clarke is associate professor at the National Security College, Australian National University.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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