Beijing has been pouring cash into Xinjiang, which recorded expenditures of Rmb1.3tn ($157bn) last year against revenues of just Rmb454bn. State financial transfers to the region rose to Rmb1.1tn in the 2009-14 period, almost double what had been remitted over the previous 54 years, while richer provinces have invested another Rmb54bn in 4,900 aid projects.<\/p>\n
Mr Xi is effectively \u201cdoubling down\u201d on his predecessors\u2019 bet that big investments in economic development \u2014 and regional security forces \u2014 will quell the unrest in Xinjiang, Mr Leibold says.<\/p>\n
While Beijing maintains it is combating what it calls \u201cthe three forces\u201d of ethnic separatism, religious extremism and terrorism in the region, others argue that the violence stems from a government strategy that has alienated Xinjiang\u2019s Uighur community. Of the just 23m people living in the arid but energy-rich region, Uighurs account for about 43 per cent of the population \u2014 down from as much as 90 per cent before the establishment of the People\u2019s Republic of China in 1949.<\/p>\n
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Many of Xinjiang\u2019s cities are plastered with crude, billboard-sized cartoons depicting the hell that awaits those who succumb to Islamic fundamentalism \u2014 and the heaven for those who embrace a \u201cunified and multi-ethnic\u201d China. At a food market in Aksu, a hub for a larger agricultural and mining area, a Uighur trader waves a dismissive hand at the warnings. \u201cThat propaganda is all rubbish,\u201d he says in heavily accented Chinese. \u201cThere is no freedom in Xinjiang.\u201d<\/p>\n
The inability of so many Uighurs to attain even basic proficiency in Chinese \u2014 most speak Uighur, a language related to Turkish \u2014 is one of the reasons they are passed over for the best jobs, and why Han migrants are often better placed to seize opportunities. In a visit to the region last year, Mr Xi acknowledged that \u201cresource exploitation has enriched large enterprises and entrepreneurs rather than the local area and its people\u201d.<\/p>\n
The Chinese government, however, says there is no connection between the violence and its own policies in Xinjiang. Instead, it blames terrorists and religious extremists, some of them allegedly funded or inspired by foreign groups whose aim is to \u201csplit up\u201d China.<\/p>\n
\u201cThese violent and bloody crimes show clearly that the perpetrators are anything but representatives of \u2018national\u2019 or \u2018religious\u2019 interests,\u201d the State Council said last month in a white paper marking the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Xinjiang as a special autonomous region. \u201cThey are a great and real threat to ethnic unity and social stability in Xinjiang.\u201d<\/p>\n
A militarised region<\/strong><\/p>\nAn alternative explanation is that Beijing is now confronted with an entirely homegrown problem rooted in flawed policies that the government refuses to acknowledge, let alone correct. As a result, some critics believe the region risks a downward spiral in which violence begets an ever more militarised response that begets additional violence \u2014 all at a time when Xinjiang is more central than ever to the ruling Communist party\u2019s larger geopolitical objectives.<\/p>\n
Xinjiang now resembles a militarised state, with a blatant police and military presence. While most experts say its insurgency does not qualify as a \u201clow-intensity conflict\u201d, evidence of the potential for violence is everywhere.<\/p>\n
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An Urumqi street where five alleged Uighur separatists killed 31 people last year is a bar area by night, with private armed guards protecting each establishment. People entering Urumqi\u2019s People\u2019s Park, a popular recreation area in the city centre, are searched by soldiers in stab-resistant vests and helmets while armed police patrol the park grounds in groups of five or more.<\/p>\n
Feng Guoping, a Han Chinese resident of Urumqi, says \u201ceverything has changed since July 5\u201d, referring to the date of the city\u2019s deadly 2009 riots. \u201cNow we are on guard against the Uighurs and they are on guard against us,\u201d adds Mr Feng, whose parents moved to Urumqi from Jiangsu province when he was 11 because they thought their son would have a better chance at getting into university in Xinjiang.<\/p>\n
In Aksu almost every symbol of the state \u2014 from police stations to telecommunications offices \u2014 is protected by barbed wire and barricades. Hotels and shopping centres force visitors to pass through metal detectors before entering. A meat and vegetable market \u2014 its stalls run almost entirely by Han Chinese migrants \u2014 is protected by security guards armed with nail-spiked bars.<\/p>\n
Critics of Chinese government policy in the region say the steady pattern of violence can be traced to the issue of Document No 7 in the mid-1990s. Essentially a strategy blueprint for how to combat a surge in violence, the document blamed the deteriorating situation on \u201cthe infiltration and sabotaging activities of foreign religious powers\u201d. It also called for a security-led response and tighter religious controls.<\/p>\n
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The document\u2019s adoption ended a 1980s policy that emphasised autonomy and tolerance in Xinjiang and Tibet after the decimation of both regions\u2019 distinct cultural and religious traditions during the cultural revolution.<\/p>\n
Jiang Zhaoyong, a Beijing-based ethnic affairs analyst, agrees with the analysis underpinning Document No 7, arguing that \u201cthe violence has something to do with the fact that many people spend all their time praying and chanting scripts and the spread of Islamic extremism in Xinjiang\u201d.<\/p>\n
Human Rights Watch counters that China\u2019s war on terror at home has been used to justify \u201cpervasive ethnic discrimination, severe religious repression and increasing cultural suppression\u201d in Xinjiang. Analysts also doubt the government\u2019s claim that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and other shadowy groups are behind many of the attacks. ETIM, they suspect, is more bark than bite and a convenient scapegoat.<\/p>\n
\u201cWhen we try to understand who these people are [there is] a complete absence of information,\u201d says David O\u2019Brien, a regional expert at the University of Nottingham Ningbo. \u201cWhat are portrayed as co-ordinated attacks might be more localised issues.\u201d<\/p>\n
Wang Lixiong, a prominent government critic, says the adoption of Document No 7 signified a return to \u201chardline\u201d ethnic policies. \u201cA new tone was set and that same policy is still enforced today \u2014 political repression combined with significant economic support. It\u2019s one hand hard and one hand soft.\u201d<\/p>\n
Extending grace<\/strong><\/p>\nIt is in fact an approach that dates back to at least the mid-18th century, when the Qing dynasty extended China\u2019s borders and offered conquered peoples \u201cgrace\u201d if they submitted to the emperor\u2019s might.<\/p>\n
Under Communist party rule, grace includes local government investment in refurbishing Uighur villages, transforming them into quaint tourist destinations. Ajiahan Wuxur, 68, was the beneficiary of one such project in Turpan, an oasis town near Urumqi. \u201cPreviously we could only make money selling grapes,\u201d says Ms Wuxur, who now runs a tourist restaurant from her home. \u201cThere were fixed quotas for production and we had no other income.\u201d<\/p>\n
At the other end of the policy spectrum, boys and girls under the age of 18 are barred from places of worship, while bans on \u201cunusual or strange\u201d beards and headscarves are common. Xinjiang\u2019s more than 800,000 civil servants, about half of whom are ethnic minorities, are prohibited from participating in religious activities. One religious leader, who asked not to be identified, says he often performed private home ceremonies for government officials. \u201cIt still happens but it must be kept secret with very few guests,\u201d he says.<\/p>\n
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Reza Hasmath at Oxford university argues that the government\u2019s \u201cone hand hard, one hand soft\u201d policy has failed to address two of the Uighur community\u2019s longstanding grievances \u2014 poorer job opportunities despite having a higher average educational level than Han Chinese in the region, and a lack of meaningful political representation.<\/p>\n
\u201cThese soft and hard policies don\u2019t get to the underlying root causes of conflict in Xinjiang,\u201d he says. \u201cYounger generation [Uighurs] want to have their expectations met in the labour market. When those expectations are not met they turn to their ethnicity and religion. \u201d<\/p>\n
According to Mr Wang, another consequence of the government\u2019s policies in Xinjiang has been an eradication of moderate Uighur voices who advocate an approach that emphasises religious toleration and political autonomy.<\/p>\n
Uighurs advocating this message are increasingly treated as \u201cviolent ethnic separatists\u201d in disguise, as evidenced by last year\u2019s prosecution of Ilham Tohti<\/a>. Mr Tohti, an ethnic Uighur professor at Minzu University in Beijing and a bridge between his community and the government, was handed a life sentence for allegedly advocating independence.<\/p>\n\u201cIlham Tohti was in fact very moderate,\u201d says Mr Wang, who himself has been banned from publishing in China and is subject to routine police harassment for his criticism of Beijing\u2019s ethnic policies. \u201cBut the government wants you to be either an enemy or a flunky. It\u2019s hard for them to deal with someone who stands in the middle.\u201d<\/p>\n
Additional reporting by Wan Li and Christian Shepherd<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
FT series: Beijing\u2019s attempts to tame energy-rich Xinjiang may be stoking unrest from its ethnic Uighurs<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":2126,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"topic":[],"class_list":["post-2127","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2127","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2127"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2127\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2126"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2127"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2127"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2127"},{"taxonomy":"topic","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/topic?post=2127"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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