![](\"http:\/\/docs.uyghuramerican.org\/images\/OJ-AD200_CWORLD_16U_20151130234816.jpg\")
<\/p>\nChina needs West\u2019s buy-in on stabilizing effects of its Silk Road project<\/p>\n
By ANDREW BROWNE
Dec. 1, 2015 1:02 a.m. ET<\/p>\n
China has long tried to get the West to acknowledge that the Muslim extremist violence that rages from North Africa through the Middle East and onward to Central Asia ultimately ends up on China\u2019s western doorstep.<\/p>\n
But its claims about cross-border terrorism have met a skeptical response: Many Western security analysts believe that attacks by Muslim Uighurs in China\u2019s Xinjiang region have more to do with anger against the Chinese government\u2019s religious and cultural repression than global jihad.<\/p>\n
And there has indeed been little hard evidence of spillover into Xinjiang. In his book \u201cThe China-Pakistan Axis: Asia\u2019s New Geopolitics,\u201d the Central Asia specialist Andrew Small describes how China has skillfully kept Islamic militants across the border at bay, in spite of its harsh treatment of its Muslim minority. China\u2019s pitch to them, he writes: \u201cDon\u2019t bother us and we won\u2019t bother you.\u201d<\/p>\n
But as Islamic State and other groups that China has little familiarity with send fresh waves of instability along the overland arc of terror, that bargain is threatened. So is what China sees as essentially a Marshall plan to extend Chinese-style economic development to its troubled inland neighbors.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
In the aftermath of the Paris massacre, a question worth asking is whether China can get the West to work with it on a network of highways, railways, power stations and industrial parks stretching all the way to Europe. The Silk Road Economic Belt represents the most significant economic proposal any country has put forward to help stabilize chaotic parts of the world. Moreover, it\u2019s backed by hard cash: China is putting its $3.5 trillion of foreign-exchange reserves behind the effort to kick-start growth and create jobs in Muslim areas.<\/p>\n
Pulling off the vast project on its own may be impossible for China. It has lavish funds, engineering expertise and even the necessary diplomatic relationships, especially with Pakistan. However, it lacks military reach and experience on the ground dealing with complex security problems. And its long-standing policy of \u201cnoninterference\u201d in other country\u2019s affairs limits its political options, although it\u2019s starting to shed some of that reticence in order to protect its nationals and investments abroad. Just last week, China announcedits first overseas naval outpost in the East African nation of Djibouti.<\/p>\n
Beijing\u2019s initial response to the Paris attacks, however, highlights some of the obstacles to practical cooperation. Instead of quickly offering its support in beating back Islamic State, Foreign MinisterWang Yi complained that China is a victim of terrorism too. He warned the West against \u201cdouble standards\u201d in playing down the terrorist threat in Xinjiang.<\/p>\n
At stake is an immensely ambitious Chinese initiative that is critical to Beijing\u2019s effort to secure its vulnerable western flank. The project is twinned with an equally sweeping concept, the Maritime Silk Road, that\u2019s meant to have a similarly transformative economic impact along sea routes from China to Europe via Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa.<\/p>\n
Some critics dismiss the \u201cOne Belt, One Road\u2019 idea as self-serving\u2014a way to offload China\u2019s vast industrial surpluses of steel and heavy machinery. Others say it\u2019s always been hostage to militant forces. In recent years, China has been forced to pull back from several gigantic investments in chronically unstable parts of the world after deadly attacks on its workers. The killing of three Chinese rail executives in the recent hotel siege in Mali highlights the dangers.<\/p>\n
To protect further investments, China might have to show military force, or take sides in regional politics, making it a bigger target for the jihadists. Many doubt that China is ready to take those kinds of risks.<\/p>\n
Huge sums are aimed at Pakistan, where small numbers of Uighur fighters hide out in lawless tribal areas, protected by other militants. And Pakistan is key to what unfolds in Afghanistan\u2014another immediate Chinese neighbor\u2014now that America has drawn down its forces there.<\/p>\n
Almost everybody agrees that bombing Islamic State won\u2019t deal with the underlying problems that breed murderous fanatics.<\/p>\n
Here\u2019s China, then, with a critical missing element, a plan that some compare with the U.S. effort after World War II to rebuild the shattered economies of Europe and Japan. William H. Overholt, a senior fellow at Harvard University\u2019s Asia Center, writes that like America\u2019s visionary program, China\u2019s Silk Road initiative \u201cis impressive not just for its geographic scope but also for its integration of economic, political and national security considerations.\u201d<\/p>\n
Lifting the economic despair that sustains Muslim extremism is a vision that should naturally bring China and the U.S. together; terrorism challenges them both equally, like climate change or pandemics where they have a good track record of cooperation. And unlike East Asia, where American and Chinese strategic interests collide, in the Muslim world they largely coincide.<\/p>\n
Xinjiang could become the place where China\u2019s internal security unravels. Or it could be the launchpad for a global effort to counter the appeal of Muslim death cults. But for that, China needs to convince the West of the value of its Silk Road plans.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
China needs West\u2019s buy-in on stabilizing effects of its Silk Road project<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":2237,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"topic":[],"class_list":["post-2238","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2238","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2238"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2238\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2237"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2238"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2238"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2238"},{"taxonomy":"topic","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/topic?post=2238"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}