{"id":2936,"date":"2016-09-02T23:39:34","date_gmt":"2016-09-02T23:39:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.iuhrdf.org\/en\/2016\/09\/02\/its-time-rethink-worlds-approach-human-rights-china\/"},"modified":"2016-09-02T23:39:34","modified_gmt":"2016-09-02T23:39:34","slug":"its-time-rethink-worlds-approach-human-rights-china","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/its-time-rethink-worlds-approach-human-rights-china\/","title":{"rendered":"It\u2019s Time to Rethink the World\u2019s Approach to Human Rights in China"},"content":{"rendered":"

Washington, Brussels, and others have plenty of leverage over Beijing. Now they just have to use it.<\/p>\n

BY SOPHIE RICHARDSON
\u200b\u200b\u200b\u200b\u200b\u200b\u200bSEPTEMBER 1, 2016 – 3:38 PM<\/p>\n

When world leaders touch down in early September in the city of Hangzhou for this year\u2019s G20 leaders\u2019 summit, which China will they see? The one of glossy skylines, enviable growth statistics, and perfectly choreographed diplomatic exchanges? Or the one in which China\u2019s prominent human and civil rights lawyers<\/a> are detained, forcibly disappeared, and prosecuted on charges of subversion? The one in which civil society groups aiding survivors of domestic violence<\/a> and sexual harassment<\/a> are abruptly shut down?<\/p>\n

And will they see the ominous international trend emerging, of Chinese authorities and their agents abducting critics<\/a> outside the mainland, then broadcasting<\/a> some of their \u201cconfessions\u201d on national television, while often denying<\/a> their lawyers, family members, and \u2014 in the cases of those who hold other citizenship \u2014 even embassies access<\/a> to them? To be fair, governments and international institutions have expressed concern about these trends. \u201cThese actions undermine China\u2019s claim to be a rule of law society and run contrary China\u2019s human rights commitments and hinder its attempts to build a more transparent and effective justice system,\u201d commented<\/a> the United States Department of State. The European Union agreed<\/a>: \u201cThese cases are part of a worrying trend and call into question China\u2019s respect for the rule of law and for its international human rights obligations, not least freedom of speech.\u201d And in March 2016, a dozen governments made a rare public joint statement<\/a> to the U.N. Human Rights Council, claiming that \u201cthese actions are in contravention of China\u2019s own laws and international commitments.\u201d Yet increasingly, these expressions of concern read more as statements of the painfully obvious. What they lack is clarity about what the United States, the European Union, or others will actually do in response to China\u2019s sharply escalating repression.<\/p>\n

For more than a decade, the strategy of governments with an interest in human rights in China has been persuasion and even chumminess, punctuated periodically with public outrage<\/a> at some particularly negative development, such as the imprisonment of the democracy advocate Liu Xiaobo, who was later awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. And sometimes, these governments have put forward logically coherent and instrumentally compelling arguments to appeal to Beijing\u2019s interest in long-term stability. They cite<\/a> the need for an independent judicial system, and the value of differing views to reach good policy decisions and of a predictable legal system for foreign and domestic investors. And, critically, they try to find, engage, and support the work of more reform-minded elements in the Chinese government, government representatives have told me privately.<\/p>\n

But those elements are much harder to identify under the harsh, doctrinaire rule of Chinese President Xi Jinping. And as sympathetic as those reformers may have been to more rights-respecting rule, since Xi ascended to the top of the ruling Communist Party in late 2012 they have not been in a position to see meaningful liberal reforms through the stifling one-party system.<\/p>\n

Moreover, Beijing simply does not believe that respecting human rights will produce more peaceful, stable outcomes in the regions of Tibet or Xinjiang, or that tolerating peaceful criticism is critical to China\u2019s future. Increasingly, it construes all manner of behavior it does not like as a threat to national security. And while many governments recognize Beijing\u2019s abusive trends, few are willing to consider leveling meaningful consequences in response, often privately lamenting their lack of leverage.<\/p>\n

But the United States, the E.U., and others are able to find their voices and their leverage when China\u2019s conduct on national security or economic issues proves problematic. Do they wring their hands, fretting about Chinese leaders\u2019 \u201cface\u201d \u2014 as they often do when privately explaining why they don\u2019t engage in stronger public diplomacy on human rights issues \u2014 when discussing China\u2019s sovereignty claims in the South China Seas? No; the U.S. deploys<\/a> guided missile destroyers through those waters, proving a point about freedom of navigation. When Beijing or its agents hack large government-run databases of critical information, do governments limit themselves to raising these issues on the sidelines in a closed-door meeting? No; they summon to their capitals senior Chinese government officials and explain<\/a> that, on the eve of a state visit, sanctions against individuals and organizations will ensue if the attacks don\u2019t stop. And indeed the attacks abate. Do major businesses and industries settle for their governments\u2019 making statements about the investment and trade secrets hemorrhaged in China, or Chinese policies that disadvantage foreign companies? No; they take cases to the World Trade Organization<\/a>, add requirements for reforms in China into bilateral investment treaties, and collectively push back against proposals such as \u201cindigenous innovation<\/a>.\u201d These tactics require tenacity, confidence, and unity among companies and governments. While they certainly do not always work, in many cases they lead to changes in Chinese government policies, showing that it is possible to change Chinese officials\u2019 calculus and behavior.<\/p>\n

Decades of experience should make clear to Washington, Brussels, and others that Beijing responds only to the expectation of unpleasant consequences.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Decades of experience should make clear to Washington, Brussels, and others that Beijing responds only to the expectation of unpleasant consequences. It\u2019s hardly only their fault that the human rights situation in China has deteriorated, but it\u2019s equally clear that their standard tools \u2014 primarily private persuasion, occasionally public condemnation or modest engagement with Chinese officials \u2014 have not produced the desired results.<\/p>\n

For those countries who wish to effect positive change on human rights in China, Beijing\u2019s desire for cooperation on issues ranging from counter-terrorism to anti-corruption and its integration into global economic and governance systems provide opportunities. If governments, the E.U., the U.N., and others are as serious about trying to improve the human rights situation in China as they claim to be, and are not just happy with a strong political or trade relationship, they should rethink their approach and consider the following entry points:<\/p>\n