Overbroad Counterterrorism Legal Framework Opens Door to Abuses<\/p>\n
MARCH 16, 2017 7:45PM EDT<\/p>\n
(New York) \u00ad\u2013 The Chinese<\/a> authorities\u2019 failure to release details about terrorism convictions heightens concerns that the country\u2019s counterterrorism law is being used to prosecute nonviolent activity, Human Rights Watch said today. The 2017 Supreme People\u2019s Court (SPC) report, presented on March 12, 2017, departs from past practice by excluding details on 2016 terrorism cases, such as the number of individuals convicted. China\u2019s new Counterterrorism Law took effect in January 2016.<\/p>\n Human Rights Watch said that China\u2019s terrorism prosecutions, primarily in the northwestern region of Xinjiang, are subject to politically motivated abuse because of the expansive definition of terrorism, lack of transparency, and violations of fair trial rights.<\/p>\n \u201cThe Chinese government claims it\u2019s combating terrorism threats, particularly in Xinjiang, but gives scarce details about these incidents while strictly controlling access of journalists and other independent monitors,\u201d said Sophie Richardson<\/a>, China director. \u201cBy refusing to provide information on terrorism cases, Beijing can easily suppress rights to peaceful criticism and religious identity.\u201d<\/p>\n The 2016 SPC\u2019s annual report<\/a> to the National People\u2019s Congress stated that in 2015, Chinese courts convicted 1,419 people for threatening state security, inciting \u201csplittism,\u201d and taking part in terrorism \u2013 nearly double the numbers of the previous year\u2019s report<\/a>. But the court\u2019s 2015 and 2016 reports did not disclose a breakdown of these numbers, so it is unclear how many people were convicted for terrorism and precisely for which offense.<\/p>\n Human Rights Watch examined available data from China Court Net<\/a>, a general news site run by the SPC, and the Peking University Law Database for information on terrorism-related cases in 2016. Only four court verdicts related to terrorism prosecutions from 2016 are publicly available. These two sources may only contain a small percentage of terrorism-related verdicts in 2016. The SPC decision that required court verdicts be posted online provides exemptions for cases that involve state secrets or personal privacy, and cases that are otherwise \u201cnot suitable for making public,\u201d which gives the courts wide latitude to withhold information.<\/p>\n The four cases involved seven people \u2013 all but one ethnic Uyghurs from Xinjiang. Five received prison sentences from eight months to three years, while one was given a suspended sentence and one was exempted from criminal penalties.<\/p>\n In all four cases, the individuals were convicted of possessing, accessing, and distributing terrorism-related videos or audios. Three of the verdicts gave details about these materials:<\/p>\n In addition to these cases, Human Rights Watch learned about a dozen other individuals who were punished with days of detention and fines under administrative laws for watching, downloading, or storing audio, videos, and pictures related to extremism and terrorism during this period, but which were not severe enough to constitute criminal acts.<\/p>\n State media reports about the implementation of the new Counterterrorism Law, in effect since January 1, 2016, show a similar focus<\/a> of the authorities to punish, through fines or days of administrative detention, possession or distribution of materials<\/a> that the authorities consider as \u201cterrorist\u201d or \u201cextremist\u201d in nature, as well as distributing \u201cfake terrorism information.\u201d The Counterterrorism Law gives expansive definitions of \u201cterrorism\u201d and \u201cextremism,\u201d and does not clearly articulate what constitutes \u201cfake terrorism information.\u201d<\/p>\n Governments may prosecute speech that incites criminal acts \u2013 speech that directly encourages the commission of a crime, is intended to result in criminal action, or is likely to result in criminal action \u2013 whether or not criminal action does, in fact, result. But laws that impose criminal punishment for what has been called \u201cindirect incitement\u201d \u2013 for example, justifying or glorifying terrorism \u2013 encroach on expression protected under international human rights law.<\/p>\n The implementation of China\u2019s Counterterrorism Law has also focused on punishing hotels and courier services for failure to comply with the government\u2019s \u201creal name registration\u201d requirements, in which individuals staying in hotels or sending courier posts must use their identification cards.<\/p>\n None of the publicly available information about the people who received administrative or criminal punishments on terrorism-related charges in 2016 indicates they perpetrated or were linked to violent acts. The last two state reports about violence in Xinjiang, for example, suggested that those who committed violent acts were killed<\/a> at the scene by security forces<\/a>.<\/p>\n China\u2019s terrorism convictions will generate disbelief as long as the criminal process remains opaque and so little information reaches the public.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n China Director<\/p>\n Xinjiang, home to 10 million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, is a site of pervasive discrimination, repression, and restriction on fundamental human rights including freedom of religion. Opposition to central and local policies has been expressed in peaceful protests, but also through bombings and other acts of violence.<\/p>\n A 2015 report<\/a> by the Uyghur Human Rights Project documented more than 600 casualties in violent incidents in Xinjiang between 2013 and 2014, which included people killed by criminal offenders and state security forces.<\/p>\n The Chinese government has often blamed attacks on \u201cforeign\u201d forces including ETIM, an alleged separatist organization founded by Uyghurs which has been on the United Nations list of terrorist organizations since 2002, though the group\u2019s existence has been debated. The government has not offered invitations to independent monitors to investigate such incidents, including the UN special rapporteur on torture and the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.<\/p>\n \u201cChina\u2019s terrorism convictions will generate disbelief as long as the criminal process remains opaque and so little information reaches the public,\u201d Richardson said. \u201cThe government needs to open up the system to independent monitors from China and abroad, including the UN.\u201d China\u2019s laws on terrorism and extremism open the door to abusive treatment of suspects accused of such crimes.<\/p>\n Under the Counterterrorism Law, police are empowered to impose far-reaching restrictions on individuals they merely suspect of being involved in terrorism, even if they have little or no evidence (articles 39, 53). If police \u201creceive a report of suspected terrorist activity, or discover suspected terrorist activity,\u201d they can \u201corder\u201d the suspects to comply with \u201cone or more of these restrictive measures\u201d (article 53).<\/p>\n The restrictions include bans on traveling outside the suspect\u2019s area of residence or the country without police approval, bans on taking public transportation or entering specified venues without police approval, as well as ID and passport confiscation.<\/p>\n The decision to impose these restrictions is an entirely internal procedure within the police system. Because there are no clear criteria in the Counterterrorism Law on imposing or withdrawing any of the restrictions, they can be imposed arbitrarily and, for some of the restrictions, indefinitely. Moreover, these restrictions apply prior to the stage of a police investigation, effectively giving police the power of preventive detention before a decision is made whether to file a case (ch: li\u2019an). This means that the legal guarantee of the right to legal counsel, or any procedural rights stipulated in China\u2019s Criminal Procedure Law, do not apply throughout this process.<\/p>\n Some of the suspects subjected to this preventive detention will proceed to pretrial proceedings under the Criminal Procedure Law, but pretrial proceedings in terrorism cases are opaque<\/a>: the Criminal Procedure Law denies terrorism suspects basic defense protections, including access to family members and lawyers, and allows suspects to be held for months in undisclosed locations. The Counterterrorism Law states that terrorism suspects and prisoners \u201cmay be\u201d subjected to solitary confinement (article 29); the Xinjiang Implementing Measures state those who are \u201cmajor ringleaders\u201d will always be subjected to solitary confinement because of their crime (article 40). The same applies to those who commit or incite others to commit crimes while in confinement, or refuse to be \u201cre-educated\u201d and show \u201cviolent tendencies.\u201d The Implementing Measures do not outline any review mechanisms for imposing solitary confinement, or conditions for lifting it. This is contrary to the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners<\/a> (the Mandela Rules), which prohibit the use of indefinite solitary confinement as it amounts to torture. China is a party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which it ratified in 1988.<\/p>\n Under the Counterterrorism Law, prior to release, prisons or detention centers are empowered to conduct an assessment of the \u201cdanger \u2026 posed to society\u201d by these individuals when they complete their sentences (article 30). The assessment is sent to the intermediate people\u2019s court of the region where the sentence was served.<\/p>\n If the court finds that the convict is a \u201cdanger to society,\u201d it should \u201corder\u201d the person to receive an \u201ceducational placement\u201d (ch: jiaoyu anzhi), a measure undertaken by provincial governments, even after a sentence is completed. Yet there are no clear criteria for such an assessment, or clear explanation whether this \u201ceducational placement\u201d involves deprivation of liberty. The Counterterrorism Law also does not provide a time limit for this \u201ceducational placement\u201d measure. The Implementing Measures state that it is the \u201ceducation placement\u201d institutions that can make a recommendation to the local court to remove such measures, but do not explain how the individual being subjected to the measure can apply to have it removed.<\/p>\n These provisions mean that even after someone has served a full sentence they can remain effectively indefinitely detained, with little or no recourse. Vague, Overbroad Definitions of Terrorism in Chinese Law<\/strong><\/p>\n Since 2014, the Chinese government has revised or drafted new legislation<\/a> to combat terrorism. Taken together, these laws criminalize<\/a> a wide range of activities<\/a>. They restrict participating, abetting, organizing, or funding terrorism, as well as possessing, publishing, printing, or distributing content that contains terrorism, including digital content. They encourage \u201cthe masses\u201d to report on terrorists and terrorism activities, and they set out penalties for those who withhold such information.<\/p>\n Xinjiang is the only region in China that has a set of Implementing Measures on the Counterterrorism Law<\/a> (Xinjiang Implementing Measures), which have been in effect since August 1, 2016. Two recently revised regional regulations \u2013 one on religious affairs<\/a> and one on prevention of juvenile crimes<\/a> \u2013 also mention prohibitions against terrorism. The National People\u2019s Congress is also drafting<\/a> a new Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Anti-Religious Extremism Law, according to state media.<\/p>\n Human Rights Watch has repeatedly raised human rights concerns in China\u2019s approach to terrorism and extremism<\/a>. Chinese laws define terrorism in an overly broad and vague manner, and do not necessarily require actual action or violence to prompt prosecution, deprivation of liberty, or other restrictions:<\/p>\n Under these expansive definitions of terrorism and extremism, a large range of activity relevant to ethnic and religious expression and custom are punishable and are being prohibited, including:<\/p>\n Overbroad Counterterrorism Legal Framework Opens Door to Abuses<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":3515,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"topic":[],"class_list":["post-3516","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3516","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3516"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3516\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3515"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3516"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3516"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3516"},{"taxonomy":"topic","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/topic?post=3516"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n
Sophie Richardson<\/h4>\n
<\/p>\nAbuses of Individuals Suspected of Terrorism, Extremism<\/strong><\/h5>\n
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