On March 30, 2017, China\u2019s official news agency, Xinhua, announced a new policy aimed at curbing Muslim extremism in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. <\/p>\n
By Perry Arrasmith
April 22, 2017 at 5:58 pm<\/p>\n
On March 30, 2017, China\u2019s official news agency, Xinhua, announced<\/a> a new policy aimed at curbing Muslim extremism in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The new policies appear to be aimed at Xinjiang\u2019s Uyghur minority, whose long history of autonomous rule and a distinct ethnic identity continue to create problems<\/a> for the largely centralized Chinese government.<\/p>\n For the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, repression of religious expression has long been seen as one dimension of a larger government campaign to decrease the influence of the Uyghur ethnic identity. For the Chinese government, the desire to maintain order<\/a> has often come with good intentions, but often only resulted in exacerbated tensions in the regions.<\/p>\n A Complicated Position<\/b><\/p>\n Under the rule of the central Chinese government for hundreds of years, the Uyghurs<\/a> (a distinct nomadic ethnicity of Turkic origin) of Xinjiang have long exhibited nationalist and separatist tendencies. The region\u2019s most recent expressions of an independent national identity emerged during the chaotic early decades of the twentieth century. On two separate occasions (1933-34 and 1944-49), Xinjiang managed to declare its independence<\/a> as the \u201cEast Turkestan Republic.\u201d Even after Nationalist Chinese forces managed to establish control over the province, their appointed governors often aligned themselves<\/a> closer to the Soviets over their own government, creating power structures separate from those of the central Chinese government.<\/p>\n As Communist forces consolidated control over mainland China in 1949, the last \u201cEast Turkestan Republic\u201d crumbled as Soviet support evaporated. When Mao proclaimed the People\u2019s Republic (PRC) that same year, the newly-centralized government began to give greater attention to the province. In 1956, Mao Tse-Tung warned ominously<\/a> of how the Chinese had \u201csowed feelings of estrangement among our various nationalities and bullied the minority peoples.\u201d To that end, China could not be divided by what he described as \u201cHan-Chauvinism\u201d<\/a>\u2014a term used to describe the historical domination of the Han minority over other regional ethnic groups. The native peoples of Xinjiang constituted one of the small ethnic groups Mao was describing. <\/p>\n The Constitution<\/a> of the PRC guarantees that all citizens shall enjoy \u201cenjoy freedom of religious belief.\u201d However, the government also prioritizes the need for order, especially in regions like Xinjiang and Tibet, where political instability is a common worry for the authorities. Thus, the very same article declares that \u201cno one shall make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order.\u201d So long as the Uyghurs are seen as a threat to the stability of the Chinese state, expression of cultural identity will be construed by officials as a threat to the government.<\/p>\n Frontiers of Opportunity<\/b><\/p>\n Economic development has changed the face of Xinjiang in the last few decades. The segregation between Uyghurs and Hans (the main ethnic group of China) in Urumqi, the capital of the province, has become a symbol of the divide<\/a> between the two groups. Chinese companies in Xinjiang have displayed hiring practices that reportedly favor ethnic Hans<\/a>, whose migration to Xinjiang in the last few decades has made them equal in population to the native Uyghurs, and comparatively wealthier. Without assimilation into mainstream Chinese culture, most Uyghurs cannot expect to enjoy<\/a> the wealth which continues to flow into the province.<\/p>\n On top of rising economic inequality, new educational practices have also led to concerns about the role of education in destroying Uyghur values. As traditional Islamic-oriented education is replaced by more modern<\/a> forms of education, Islamic identity has become increasingly connected to the Uyghur self-identity. Most recently, China Daily announced<\/a> that 20,000 predominantly Uyghurs students would be sent to \u201cinland cities\u201d to gain an otherwise national education at multiple levels.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, it is important to note that China\u2019s government does not persecute Islam specifically; the Hui Muslims (ethnic Hans who practice Islam) have been noted<\/a> for their prosperity in China over the last few decades. Persecution, in fact, would appear to be aimed at the Uyghur ethnic identity itself. With their history as a people separated from the larger Chinese identity, Uyghurs in Xinjiang view increased Chinese involvement in the province with suspicion<\/a>: in some cases, this contempt for the Chinese government has resulted in acts of terrorism.<\/p>\n The Rise of Terrorism<\/b><\/p>\n Terrorist activities have rocked Xinjiang over the last few decades, and show no signs of abating in the near future. The year 2017 started with the deaths of three suspected terrorists<\/a> in Xinjiang, and Xi Jinping has called China\u2019s Central Asian neighbors to help target \u201dreligious extremism and cyber terrorism.\u201d<\/a> There is a clear religious dimension to some of the attacks; the Islamic State has released a video where Uyghur members threatened to return home to China with the intent of \u201cshed[ding] blood like rivers.<\/a>\u201d<\/p>\n President Xi Jinping\u2019s recent call for a \u201cGreat Wall of Iron\u201d<\/a> in response to a continual barrage of terrorist attacks raises the specter of just how serious the conflict has become. In the last few years, vernacular to describe governance over the province has been expanded to include phrases like \u201csecurity state<\/a>.\u201d As Chinese officials look to prevent chaos in the province, their approach raises the perennial question regarding state policies on terrorism: Does repression fuel extremism, or does extremism fuel repression? In containing Xinjiang within a \u201cgreat wall of iron,\u201d the Uyghurs of Xinjiang may be pushed to suffer even more by the Chinese authorities. As they lose their identity to the influence of the East, many Uyghurs may look to an expanding Chinese state with even more disdain<\/a>.<\/p>\n Owing to the region\u2019s strategic location in Central Asia, many Uyghur extremists can easily travel abroad to train with foreign terrorist organizations. As Muslim extremism becomes increasingly common, Chinese authorities see an expanding state presence<\/a> in the region as a necessary preventative measure. These actions, in creating a more suppressed atmosphere that in turn emboldens extremism, may be planting the seeds of the very insurrection many fear will never take place.<\/p>\n Looking Ahead<\/b><\/p>\n The preamble to the Chinese constitution declares a need \u201cto promote the common prosperity of all nationalities<\/a>.\u201d For China\u2019s leaders, the harsh realities of the real world present serious obstacles to this vision. In working to find a balance between security, national unity, and minority rights, certain priorities inevitably become more important than others. In the eyes of exiled Uyghur groups like the World Uyghur Congress<\/a> (WUS), the Chinese state continues to be seen as a force of brutal repression.<\/p>\n Outside groups like the World Uyghur Congress generally assert Uyghur identity as of Central Asian origin, and culturally distinct from that of China. In a 2010 interview<\/a> with the Harvard Political Review, <\/i>Rebiya Kadeer, President of the World Uyghur Congress and a former PRC official, bluntly stated that \u201cUyghurs are not Chinese,\u201d and dismissed the view that Xinjiang could ever be a part of China. More recently, the World Uyghur Congress has continued to criticize the Chinese government\u2019s approach to fighting terrorism, arguing<\/a> that the PRC\u2019s current policies are contributing little to actually solving the crisis.<\/p>\n With China showing no signs<\/a> of giving up Xinjiang, Kadeer\u2019s hopes for a new \u201cEast Turkestan Republic\u201d appear unrealistic for the foreseeable future. Even with the WUS adopting the framework<\/a> of a \u201cnonviolent and peaceful opposition movement,\u201d violence continues to be pervasive throughout the province. The impasse between the PRC and activists like Kadeer demonstrates continued difficulty of cooperation between both sides. For now, violence seems likely to continue on China\u2019s \u201cnew frontier.\u201d<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Image Source: Flikr\/Malcolm Brown<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On March 30, 2017, China\u2019s official news agency, Xinhua, announced a new policy aimed at curbing Muslim extremism in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":3646,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"topic":[],"class_list":["post-3647","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3647","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3647"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3647\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3646"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3647"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3647"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3647"},{"taxonomy":"topic","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/topic?post=3647"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}