{"id":3871,"date":"2017-08-04T05:10:11","date_gmt":"2017-08-04T05:10:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.iuhrdf.org\/en\/2017\/08\/04\/xinjiang-authorities-convert-uyghur-mosques-propaganda-centers\/"},"modified":"2017-08-04T05:10:11","modified_gmt":"2017-08-04T05:10:11","slug":"xinjiang-authorities-convert-uyghur-mosques-propaganda-centers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/xinjiang-authorities-convert-uyghur-mosques-propaganda-centers\/","title":{"rendered":"Xinjiang Authorities Convert Uyghur Mosques Into Propaganda Centers"},"content":{"rendered":"

RFA<\/a><\/p>\n

Authorities in northwest China\u2019s Xinjiang region are turning mosques used by mostly-Muslim ethnic Uyghurs for religious and community purposes into centers disseminating political propaganda, according to local sources.<\/span>

Since Xinjiang Communist Party chief Chen Quanguo was appointed to run the region in August last year, he has initiated several harsh policies targeting the religious freedom of Uyghurs, including banning fasting during the May 26-June 24 Islamic holy month of Ramadan this year.<\/span>

A new policy controlling mosques in Kashgar (in Chinese, Kashi) prefecture\u2014an area heavily populated by Uyghurs\u2014is Chen\u2019s latest measure aimed at assimilating members of the ethnic minority, who complain of pervasive ethnic discrimination, religious repression, and cultural suppression under Chinese rule in the region.<\/span>

Under the directive, which has been implemented since June, caretakers of mosques in the prefecture are required to fly the national flag of China atop the buildings, sources said.<\/span>

They have also been ordered to remove inscriptions of Islam\u2019s holiest verse, \u201cThere is no god but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God,\u201d from mosque walls and replace them with large red banners that read \u201cLove the [Communist] Party, Love the Country\u201d in yellow writing.<\/span>

On Monday mornings, instead of a muezzin calling Muslims to prayer at the prefecture\u2019s mosques, flag-raising ceremonies are now held, followed by the singing of the Chinese national anthem and a patriotic song entitled, \u201cWithout the Communist Party, There is No New China.\u201d<\/span>

The mosque\u2019s imam or a government official then explains the meaning of the ceremony and reminds religious followers that the flag is a symbol of the sovereignty of the People\u2019s Republic of China, and urges them to love the party and nation, defend the \u201cunity of the motherland,\u201d and protect social stability.<\/span>

Furthermore, instruction is given on the duty of patriotic religious clergy to help followers embrace \u201cChinese-style socialism\u201d by strengthening the unity of the country\u2019s different ethnicities, fight violent terrorism, and make contributions to the long-term peace and stability of Xinjiang.<\/span>

While religious services are allowed to otherwise proceed as they had in the past, though administered by state-sanctioned imams, Uyghur residents of Kashgar prefecture have increasingly stopped attending mosques, citing frustration with the overwhelmingly political overtones of the gatherings.<\/span>

Officials from Kashgar\u2019s Kargilik (Yecheng) county Religious Affairs Bureau and Propaganda Office refused to comment about the new policy when contacted by RFA\u2019s Uyghur Service.<\/span>

But an official with the Loq village government in Kargilik confirmed that his local mosque was now taking part in weekly patriotism sessions.<\/span>

\u201cWe hold a flag-raising ceremony every Monday, and there is a flag flying on our mosque and \u2018Love the Party, Love the Country\u2019 banners as well,\u201d he said, speaking on condition of anonymity.<\/span>

\u201cWhen we hold the flag-raising ceremony on Monday, we sing [patriotic] \u2018red songs.\u2019 We start singing after the flag is raised. We sing \u2018Without the Communist Party, There is No New China.\u2019\u201d<\/span>

A Uyghur shop owner at a market in the seat of Kargilik county confirmed that he had seen propaganda banners on mosques there exhorting worshippers to love the party and the country.<\/span>

\u201cYes, I have seen that big banner\u2014I saw it a month ago,\u201d said the vendor, who also asked to remain unnamed. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Eid al-Fitr service<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n


Official sources in Yapchan village, in Kashgar\u2019s Yengisheher (Shule) county, told RFA that the theme of patriotism and Chinese propaganda had been pushed particularly hard during the June 25 prayer service for Eid al-Fitr\u2014a holiday marking the end of Ramadan and one of the two most important days of religious observance in Islam, along with Eid al-Adha, or the Feast of the Sacrifice.<\/span>

As a result, they said, less than 10 percent of the local population attended the service, mirroring similarly low attendance in some of the largest mosques in the Xinjiang capital Urumqi.<\/span>

According to a report by the official Xinjiang Television, \u201cmore than 400 believers gathered under the flag\u201d in the square in front of Yanghan Mosque in Urumqi, where they \u201cattentively watched the flag being raised as they sang along with the national anthem.\u201d<\/span>

Later, the grand imam of Yanghan Mosque, Sheripjan, delivered a lecture on \u201cresolutely walking the Chinese-style path, reviving the Chinese-style spirit, and solidifying Chinese strength, while stressing how religious believers can be devoted citizens.\u201d<\/span>

Additionally, the report said, Chongkowruk Mosque in the capital drew \u201cmore than 200 religious believers\u201d to its Eid prayer service.<\/span>

Yanghan Mosque normally draws several thousand attendees for prayer services, while Chongkowruk Mosque can hold more than 1,000 people.<\/span>

A police officer from Yapchan told RFA that \u201conly 141 [of 1,500] villagers came to the prayer service\u201d for Eid al-Fitr at his local mosque, and that nobody under the age of 18, or from the families of party members, village cadres, civil servants, or other government employees attended.<\/span>

\u201cWe kept a close watch on people on the outside, with some of us monitoring on closed circuit television and some of us monitoring and protecting [on foot patrol],\u201d he said, adding that 21 people in total had been assigned to observe the proceedings.<\/span>

A Uyghur cadre from Yapchan said that even if he had wanted to attend the Eid al-Fitr prayer service at the village mosque, doing so would have been frowned upon because officials are instructed to honor the state before anything else.<\/span>

\u201cI\u2019m a party member, so I wouldn\u2019t ever think about going to the Eid prayer service,\u201d he said.<\/span>

\u201cIt\u2019s the same with those who are not party members\u2014as long as you get a salary from the government, you can\u2019t believe in religion. Only farmers have the freedom to believe in religion.\u201d<\/span>

A Uyghur security official from Yapchan confirmed that Eid was off-limits for ranking government employees.<\/span>

\u201cIt isn\u2019t possible for us to attend the Eid prayer service because we\u2019re government cadres,\u201d he said.<\/span>

\u201cAnyway, government cadres cannot believe in religion. We can never attend prayer services and wouldn\u2019t dream of going.\u201d<\/span>

Mosques vs. Party schools<\/strong>

Ilshat Hassan, president of the Washington-based Uyghur American Association, told RFA that propaganda is now so pervasive in Xinjiang\u2019s mosques that they \u201care barely distinguishable from China\u2019s Communist Party schools.\u201d<\/span>

\u201cUyghur Muslims don’t know whether they are going to a mosque for prayer or a propaganda center to praise the Chinese Communist Party,\u201d he said.<\/span>

He dismissed China\u2019s bid to put Karl Marx, the founder of an atheist political system he called responsible for the death of \u201cmillions of people around the world,\u201d above a God worshipped by more than one billion people.<\/span>

\u201cClearly, it’s not the pious Uyghur Muslims who are extremists, as described by the Chinese authorities,\u201d he said.<\/span>

\u201cIt’s the Chinese government that’s driving an extremist agenda in [Xinjiang], turning the House of the Almighty into the House of Marx. The Muslim world should not let China do this to the Uyghur people with impunity.\u201d<\/span>

Rights groups accuse Chinese authorities of heavy-handed rule in Xinjiang, including violent police raids on Uyghur households, restrictions on Islamic practices, and curbs on the culture and language of the Uyghur people.<\/span>

China regularly vows to crack down on what it calls the \u201cthree evils\u201d of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism in Xinjiang.<\/span>

But experts outside China say Beijing has exaggerated the threat from Uyghur separatists, and that domestic policies  are responsible for an upsurge in violence that has left hundreds dead since 2012.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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