{"id":4265,"date":"2018-10-25T14:14:07","date_gmt":"2018-10-25T14:14:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.iuhrdf.org\/en\/2018\/10\/25\/securitization-and-mass-detentions-xinjiang-how-uyghurs-became-quarantined-outside-world\/"},"modified":"2018-10-25T14:14:07","modified_gmt":"2018-10-25T14:14:07","slug":"securitization-and-mass-detentions-xinjiang-how-uyghurs-became-quarantined-outside-world","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/securitization-and-mass-detentions-xinjiang-how-uyghurs-became-quarantined-outside-world\/","title":{"rendered":"Securitization and mass detentions in Xinjiang: How Uyghurs became quarantined from the outside world"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China is home to some 12 million indigenous Turkic-speaking Muslims, primarily Uyghurs but also smaller numbers of Kazakhs and others. It is now one of the most heavily policed areas in the world<\/a>, with inhabitants detained in extraordinary numbers.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the past year, foreign media outlets have relentlessly reported on the mass incarceration<\/a> and cultural suppression of the Uyghurs, forcing Beijing to acknowledge<\/a> at a recent public forum the existence of what it calls \u201cre-education centers\u201d for the first time.<\/span><\/p>\n

China has sought to justify its extreme policies in Xinjiang as a fight against Islamic radicalization and extremism as well as Uyghur \u201cseparatism.\u201d The 9\/11 attacks on the United States were a watershed moment for these policies\u2014after the attacks, Beijing started to explain incidences of unrest or random violence in Xinjiang, which previously were termed \u201cseparatism,\u201d as premeditated terrorist attacks spurred by religious extremism.<\/span><\/p>\n

Criminalizing Islam<\/span><\/h2>\n

Since the 1980s, there has been a rise in Islamic piety in Xinjiang, amid a broader religious revival in Central Asia. It primarily took the form of a steady rise in piety: building new community mosques, growing numbers of people adopting daily prayer, fasting and forms of Islamic dress, and many debates about how to be a good Muslim.<\/span><\/p>\n

China\u2019s increasingly severe policies toward Islam after 2001 produced a downward spiral of repression, which provoked violent incidents\u2014including deadly riots<\/a> in 2009 in Urumqi between Uyghurs and Han Chinese\u2014which then provoked further repression. By 2014 this cycle of violence had escalated to the point that some Uyghur-initiated acts of violence began looking increasingly like planned terrorist attacks. That year saw the killing of 33 people with knives by a band of masked Uyghurs in a train station in Kunming<\/a>, and the bombing of a train station<\/a> in Urumqi that killed 43. In response, the Chinese government declared a \u201cPeople\u2019s War on Terror.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

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REUTERS\/DAVID GRAY<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>
Paramilitary police stand guard across the entrance to a large mosque in the <\/span>centre<\/span> of Urumqi, July 9, 2009.<\/span><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In my view, it is China\u2019s concerns about this broad-based Islamic revival that have motivated the current heavy securitization of the region. Its so-called anti-terror policies are not targeted at small groups potentially vulnerable to <\/span>extremism,<\/span> but at all forms of religious expression. The \u201cPeople\u2019s War on Terror\u201d is directly linked to president Xi Jinping\u2019s wider moves to establish his personal authority, and to demonstrate absolute control over this key strategic region, in order to ensure the success of the flagship Belt and Road Initiative<\/a>, of which Xinjiang is an important part<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

New counter-terrorism legislation introduced in 2015<\/a> defined \u201cterrorism\u201d in a way that criminalized virtually any Uyghur expression of dissent or religiosity as signs of religious extremism and terrorism. It introduced extensive powers of surveillance and censorship, especially regarding internet and social media communications. It curtailed Uyghur mobility; Uyghurs were required to apply for a \u201cconvenience card\u201d<\/a> (paywall) if they wish to leave their hometown. It criminalized wearing veils, growing beards<\/a>, and other everyday religious practices including daily prayer, fasting, and halal eating practices.<\/span><\/p>\n

In 2016 Chen Quanguo<\/a>\u2014formerly party secretary in Tibet\u2014was appointed as party secretary in Xinjiang. Under Chen, Uyghurs have been effectively quarantined from the outside world\u2014people have had their passports confiscated, and by 2017, even receiving a phone call from a family member living outside China has also become an offense punishable by detention in a re-education camp. Chen introduced \u201cgrid-style\u201d social management involving extraordinarily high levels of policing, and many new recruits. Thousands of new \u201cconvenience police stations\u201d were rolled out on Xinjiang\u2019s streets to play a critical role in the surveillance.<\/span><\/p>\n

There are now numerous checkpoints on the roads, <\/span>at<\/span> <\/span>train<\/span>, and bus stations and inside towns and cities, complete with metal detectors and facial recognition or iris-scan machines. We know from independent observers that only Uyghurs are required to pass through these scanners; Han Chinese citizens pass through a separate gate. In some <\/span>areas<\/span> cars must be equipped with GPS trackers. Kitchen knives<\/a> are etched with serial numbers that are linked to the ID number of the purchaser. Human Rights Watch<\/a> has reported on the development of a biological database to assist in tracking <\/span>Uyghurs,<\/span> and on <\/span>compulsory<\/span> collecting of DNA samples.<\/span><\/p>\n

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REUTERS\/STRINGER<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>
A checkpoint in Urumqi in 2014.<\/span><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

There is also plenty of low-tech surveillance. Local people are mobilized in counter-terrorism exercises, which involve marching around the streets with big sticks. There are rewards for information: 5 million yuan ($733,000) for information on actual planned terrorist attacks, 2000 yuan for reporting face coverings or beards. Over 10,000 teams of visiting officials descended on Uyghur rural households in 2017. This was part of what was framed as the \u201cBecoming Family\u201d policy<\/a>. It involved home stays with Uyghur families by Han \u201crelatives\u201d who were required to report on \u201cextremist\u201d behavior by their hosts, such as not drinking alcohol, fasting during Ramadan, and possessing \u201cundesirable\u201d items like Qurans.<\/span><\/p>\n

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As if they were not sufficiently exhausted by all these security measures, Uyghurs are regularly <\/span>mobilised<\/span> to participate in mass activities: celebrations of Chinese culture, singing revolutionary <\/span>songs,<\/span> and dancing to counter extremism.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cWithout the Communist Party, there is no New China\u201d<\/span><\/h2>\n

The consequence of non-compliance in these activities is incarceration in the network of detention camps or \u201cre-education centers\u201d that have sprung up around the region. While estimates of the numbers of people detained <\/span>is<\/span> speculative, the available evidence suggests that more than 10% of Xinjiang\u2019s Muslim minority population\u2014Uyghur, Kazakhs, and others\u2014a total of over 1 million people, have been interned in political re-education facilities.<\/span><\/p>\n

China has only recently acknowledged the existence of these camps under heavy pressure from Western media. In response to questions raised by a United Nations committee<\/a> in August, it issued rebuttals concerning the scope and aims of the camps. However, there is mounting, incontrovertible evidence concerning the numbers of people being detained in the camps, and the methods of re-education being used there.<\/span><\/p>\n

Adrian Zenz<\/a>, a researcher at the European School of Culture and Theology in Germany, has unearthed a substantial body of government sources, showing a huge spike in government procurement and construction bids in spring 2017 valued at around 680 million yuan. They indicate both the construction of new facilities as well as upgrades and enlargements of existing re-education facilities, whose compound sizes range between 10,000 and 82,000 square meters. Many bids mandate the installation of comprehensive security features including barbed wire fences, reinforced security doors and windows, surveillance systems, watchtowers, and guardrooms.<\/span><\/p>\n

From interviews with the few people who have been released from these <\/span>camps,<\/span> and people employed<\/a> (paywall) as instructors in the camps, we know that detainees wake before dawn, sing the Chinese national anthem, and raise the Chinese flag. Instructors lecture them about the dangers of Islam, and internees are tested and punished if they fail to provide the correct answers.<\/span><\/p>\n

Forced repetition and self-criticism are central to the re-education program. Before meals, inmates chant, \u201cThank the Party! Thank the Motherland! Thank President Xi,\u201d and sing revolutionary songs such as \u201cWithout the Communist Party, there is no New China.\u201d They are required to present <\/span>self-criticism,<\/span> and submit to criticism by their fellows. They must apologize repeatedly for wearing long clothes in Muslim style, praying, teaching the Quran to their children. Those who refuse to do so are punished with solitary confinement, beatings, and food deprivation.<\/span><\/p>\n

Testimonies hint at the psychological trauma inflicted on detainees. Reports also attest to the trauma suffered by the wider Uyghur population, both within Xinjiang and in the diaspora. We know that Uyghurs within Xinjiang are struggling to maintain daily life with over 10% of the workforce in detention. Many children have been sent to state orphanages<\/a> because both their parents have been detained. Uyghurs living outside Xinjiang<\/a> are suffering from crippling anxiety and guilt: They risk detention for their relatives if they try to contact them, and they fear worse consequences for their detained relatives if they speak out.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cWeeds hidden among the crops\u201d<\/span><\/h2>\n

Since the imprisonment of moderate Uyghur intellectual Ilham Tohti<\/a>in 2014 on charges of separatism, it\u2019s been clear that the scope of Beijing\u2019s campaign in Xinjiang now goes well beyond the religious sphere. Meanwhile, the list of prominent Uyghur intellectuals, artists, and athletes who we know have been recently detained is growing, and is only the tip of the iceberg:<\/span><\/p>\n