{"id":482,"date":"2014-03-21T00:14:53","date_gmt":"2014-03-21T00:14:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.iuhrdf.org\/en\/2014\/03\/21\/chinese-grip-tibet-buddhists\/"},"modified":"2014-03-21T00:14:53","modified_gmt":"2014-03-21T00:14:53","slug":"chinese-grip-tibet-buddhists","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/chinese-grip-tibet-buddhists\/","title":{"rendered":"Chinese Grip on Tibet, Buddhists"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>After a hiatus of many months, there are indications to suggest that Beijing could be contemplating some initiative on the Tibet issue. These could comprise overtures to the Dalai Lama\u2019s establishment in Dharamsala in conjunction with the ongoing efforts to acquire and consolidate influence among Tibetan Buddhists in Nepal and the Indo-Himalayan border belt, and efforts to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party\u2019s (CCP) grip on the troubled Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Tibetan areas in adjoining provinces.<\/p>\n<p>By Jayadeva Ranade<br \/>Published: 20th March 2014 07:25 AM<br \/>Last Updated: 20th March 2014 07:25 AM<\/p>\n<p>After a hiatus of many months, there are indications to suggest that Beijing could be contemplating some initiative on the Tibet issue. These could comprise overtures to the Dalai Lama\u2019s establishment in Dharamsala in conjunction with the ongoing efforts to acquire and consolidate influence among Tibetan Buddhists in Nepal and the Indo-Himalayan border belt, and efforts to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party\u2019s (CCP) grip on the troubled Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Tibetan areas in adjoining provinces.<\/p>\n<p>Reports indicate channels have been activated between Beijing and the Tibetan establishment in Dharamsala. At least three were active in the past few months. One was direct, one was via Taiwan and the third, which was finally aborted, was through a South East Asian capital.<\/p>\n<p>The CCP leadership under Xi Jinping also continues to accord priority to the Tibet issue. Interesting was the 7,500-word article written by Xi Jinping\u2019s mother Qi Xin on the occasion of the birth centennial of Xi Jinping\u2019s father and former Chinese Vice Premier Xi Zhongxun. Publicised by Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily) and the official People\u2019s Daily on November 6, 2013, just prior to the Third Party Plenum, Qi Xin\u2019s article was laced with subtle references suggesting Buddhism\u2019s influence on Xi Jinping\u2019s family. The Third Party Plenum, incidentally, saw the further accretion of authority by Xi Jinping, who will head the newly created apex security organisation\u2014the National Security Committee (NSC). There is speculation in Beijing that the NSC could usurp the Chinese People\u2019s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)\u2019s jurisdiction over the Tibet issue.<\/p>\n<p>Internal intellectual debate on the issue is also discernible. Wang Lixiong, the Han Chinese husband of well-known Beijing-based Tibetan blogger Woeser, commented on an article by Liu Junning published in the Chinese edition of the Wall Street Journal on March 4, 2014. In his article entitled Rethinking the Policy of Regional Nationality Autonomy in Light of the Kunming Incident, Liu Junning, a researcher at the Institute of Chinese Culture, a subsidiary of China\u2019s ministry of culture, blamed China\u2019s worsening nationality problem on the disparate treatment of the minorities. He said regional nationality autonomy and demarcations between nationalities had resulted in their estrangement. Earlier, Ma Rong, a Chinese scholar of the department of sociology, Peking University, had urged the elimination of regional nationality autonomy and distinctions between nationalities. Describing these as \u201croot causes\u201d for the \u201cescalation in nationality enmity and conflict\u201d, Wang Lixiong argued that special safeguards for minority nationalities cannot be disregarded. Citing differences in their characters, he said \u201cthe character of the Han is to pursue profits first, while Tibetans, Uyghurs and Mongols are more inclined to pursue religious beliefs and happiness. This doesn\u2019t allow them to mix well in the big market economy pot with over a billion Han; it\u2019s like forcing monks to fight with soldiers\u201d. Recommending immigration controls, safeguarding the environment, continuing cultural traditions and safeguarding religious beliefs, Wang Lixiong asserted that without the protection of regional nationality autonomy \u201cany one of China\u2019s nationalities would be hard pressed to avoid being wiped away without a trace by the Han who outnumber them by a hundred thousand to one\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>He cautioned if regional nationality autonomy is abolished then the \u201cMiddle Way Approach\u201d advocated by the Dalai Lama for decades will be meaningless, and a future democratic China will have nothing with which \u201cto dispel the nationality hatreds that have been engendered by autocratic oppression\u201d. Stating that Uyghurs believe the \u201cDalai Lama has caused Tibetans to waste 30 years without achieving any results\u201d, he said the recent arrest of Uyghur professor Ilham Tohti confirmed to them that the \u201cMiddle Way Approach\u201d is just wishful thinking.<\/p>\n<p>There has also been a loosening of restrictions, apparently with Beijing\u2019s tacit approval, on Tibetan Buddhist sects organising functions in Nepal. The Sakya tradition and all its various sub-sects was, after many decades, permitted to organise Monlam celebrations in Lumbini. This is the only Tibetan Buddhist sect to so far have been granted such permission. The gesture would be aimed at accentuating the divisions among the different Tibetan Buddhist religious sects. It implicitly undermines the authority of the Dalai Lama by drawing attention to Kathmandu\u2019s unwillingness to allow him to visit Buddha\u2019s birthplace till he effects a reconciliation with the CCP leadership in Beijing.<\/p>\n<p>China\u2019s abiding interest in Nepal and, particularly the Buddha\u2019s birthplace of Lumbini on the India-Nepal border, is evident in the China Buddhist Association\u2019s decision to redevelop Lumbini. This follows the failure of the Chinese government-sponsored Asia-Pacific Exchange and Co-operation Foundation (APECF) to obtain approval for its US$3 billion project for Lumbini\u2019s re-development. The project envisages monasteries, hotels and an airport.<\/p>\n<p>An important development reinforcing Beijing\u2019s authority in the selection of high ranking lamas and \u201creincarnates\u201d is Beijing\u2019s recognition of the reincarnation of Penor Rinpoche of the Nyingmapa tradition and approval for his enthronement. The information was first disclosed in a statement issued on December 5, 2013, by the Namdrol Ling Monastery in Bylakkupe. It revealed that the reincarnation of Penor Rinpoche, former head of the Nyingma sect which is the oldest school of Tibetan Buddhism, was found in Tibet five years after his passing. The reincarnation was found by a senior lama in Tibet at a sacred location near Lhasa, based on a \u201cprophecy letter\u201d sent by 100-year-old Jadrel Rinpoche. The new reincarnation will be formally enthroned in Tibet\u2019s Palyul Monastery as its 12th throne-holder on July 31. Beijing\u2019s move leaves the Dalai Lama, who has no formal authority to approve the heads of other Tibetan Buddhist traditions, with little choice but to acknowledge the new Beijing-recognised reincarnate Penor Rimpoche. China will undoubtedly cite this as a precedent for any future case relating to the Dalai Lama.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>After a hiatus of many months, there are indications to suggest that Beijing could be contemplating some initiative on the Tibet issue. These could comprise overtures to the Dalai Lama\u2019s establishment in Dharamsala in conjunction with the ongoing efforts to acquire and consolidate influence among Tibetan Buddhists in Nepal and the Indo-Himalayan border belt, and efforts to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party\u2019s (CCP) grip on the troubled Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Tibetan areas in adjoining provinces.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":481,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"topic":[],"class_list":["post-482","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/482","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=482"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/482\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/481"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=482"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=482"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=482"},{"taxonomy":"topic","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iuhrdf.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/topic?post=482"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}