The indigenous Muslim minority group in China\u2019s western region, Xinjiang, may have a new champion in Beijing. During President Xi Jinping\u2019s recent visit to the troubled region, he spoke favorably about policies that would integrate the Turkic-speaking Uyghur into mainstream China, while reaffirming that Beijing would not tolerate any more separatist violence from them.<\/p>\n
<\/span> <\/span>\u21b5<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n By Rachel Delia Benaim The indigenous Muslim minority group in China\u2019s western region, Xinjiang, may have a new champion in Beijing. During President Xi Jinping\u2019s recent visit to the troubled region<\/a>, he spoke favorably about policies that would integrate the Turkic-speaking Uyghur into mainstream China, while reaffirming that Beijing would not tolerate any more separatist violence from them.<\/p>\n Since taking office in November 2012, Xi has cast himself as a leader who is fighting for the underrepresented populations of his country while also reemphasizing the importance and strength of the one party system. These dual missions were in evidence during his Xinjiang visit.<\/p>\n Xi\u2019s visit to Xinjiang may well mark a turning point in the economically expanding region. However, if like his predecessors he continues to ascribe the region\u2019s violence to the Uyghur minority and thereby religious separatism \u2013 as opposed to economic oppression \u2013 he is bound to repeat the mistakes of the past.<\/p>\n Standing taller \u2013 literally \u2013 than China\u2019s native Han population, the Uyghur do not look ethnically Chinese. Their thick eyebrows, dark facial hair, and generally darker and slightly more olive toned complexion immediately mark them as physically different from their neighbors. The fact that they speak their own Turkic-based language, Uyghur, which is written in an Arabic script, does not help their image of being \u201cthe other\u201d in China\u2019s nationalist narrative.<\/p>\n Moderate Sunni Muslims who practice a form of Islam heavily influenced by Sufi brotherhoods, Buddhism, and East Asian ideologies, the presence of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region can be traced back to the eighth century. Like many peoples of Central Asia, their experience was shaped by war and conquest. Now, more than half a century after Xinjiang officially became a part of greater China, the Uyghur, who account for slightly fewer than 50 percent of Xinjiang\u2019s overall population<\/a>, are still treated like strangers. They remain oppressed.<\/p>\n China maintains strict religious policies across the country, and Islam is not exempt. For example, children under the age of 18 are forbidden from practicing religion. According to Greg Fay, Project Manager at the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP), these laws are more lax in other regions, but are enforced with an iron fist against the Uyghur in Xinjiang.<\/p>\n Though Islam in China has enjoyed a robust revival in recent years, the Uyghur are facing growing oppression. More people are being arrested for online religious activities, such as watching religious classes online or searching for religious texts, in Xinjiang than ever before. \u201cThe policy in Xinjiang has become more and more rigid,\u201d Fay reflected.<\/p>\n Uyghurs complain of religious, cultural and economic persecution by China\u2019s Han-dominated government in Beijing and, much as Tibetans do, struggle to preserve their culture. Ostensibly to prevent the spread of Islamic extremism, China restricts the ability of Uyghurs to travel<\/a>.<\/p>\n The government\u2019s efforts to crack down on Islamic violence began in 1998 with the \u201cstrike hard\u201d campaign. Although this campaign was national in scale, in Xinjiang, it was solely focused on the Uyghur population. These security measures still result in hundreds of Uyghur arrests annually.<\/p>\n Later, in the post 9\/11 era, Beijing took advantage of the global culture of fear surrounding Muslims, and branded the East Turkestan Islamic Movement<\/a> (ETIM), a Uyghur terrorist group that some experts doubt even exists, as a terrorist organization. In August 2002, during a period of increased U.S.-Chinese cooperation, the U.S. State Department added the virtually unknown ETIM group to its list of terrorist groups. It was removed soon thereafter, presumably because of a lack of evidence. <\/strong><\/p>\n Yitzhak Shichor, the Michael William Lipson Chair Professor Emeritus at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and one of the \u201cXinjiang 13\u201d<\/a> who are still banned from China, is one of those who is skeptical of the existence of the ETIM. \u201cMost Uyghurs in Xinjiang aren\u2019t looking for independence. Even the expat Uyghur community isn\u2019t.\u201d Rather, what they seek is equality and opportunity. Thus, even the stated mission of what is currently referred to by the Chinese government as ETIM comes into question<\/p>\n Shichor added, \u201cI\u2019m not sure that it exists today, certainly not inside China.\u201d If the ETIM exists at all, he contended, it must be somewhere on the Internet.<\/p>\n The first mention of the ETIM appears to have been in 2000. Its Uyghur leader, Hasan Mahsum, was killed in 2003, and many claim that since his death, the ETIM has ceased to exist. Despite a number of videos<\/a> allegedly produced by the group, according to Gardner Bovingdon, a professor of Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana University and another one of the Xinjiang 13, \u201cit doesn\u2019t pass the sniff test.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cThey\u2019re amateurish and small scale,\u201d Bovingdon stated. Though the people in the videos speak in Uyghur, \u201cThere\u2019s no compelling evidence that they represent a movement that presents substantial military threats to China.\u201d<\/p>\n There is no question that Islamic radicalism exists in Xinjiang, but its dimensions and impact remain unclear. China created a correlation between Uyghur violence and religion because the Uyghur are religious. But perhaps that\u2019s not the motivation at all.<\/p>\n Take three of the major alleged Uyghur separatist attacks that have happened in the last few years: the Urumqi riots in 2009, the Tiananmen Square attack<\/a> in October 2013, and the Kunming knife attacks<\/a> in early March this year. The first two were economic protests turned violent, in which the initial protests didn\u2019t necessarily have radical Islamic elements but were expressions of mainline frustration with the government.<\/p>\n The knife attack was different. Not only did it lack Islamic undertones, is didn\u2019t even take place in Xinjiang \u2013 Kunming is more than 2,500 miles from Xinjiang\u2019s capital, Urumqi.<\/p>\n These three events were violent and tragic, \u201cbut there is no evidence that it was a Uyghur separatist movement, other than [China\u2019s] word,\u201d Bovingdon contended. He adds that a violent separatist group would normally be expected to be more active. Drawing an analogy to another frustrated stateless people, he draws a broad comparison with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: \u201cThere is no comparison between the number of episodes, their scope, and degree of plausibility if you compare these [alleged ETIM attacks] with the Intifada.\u201d<\/p>\n Xinjiang holds many untapped natural resources such as gas and cotton. In 2000, the Chinese began an aggressive campaign to develop and modernize its west, focused on Xinjiang, both as a way to expand the nation\u2019s wealth and as a way to acquire more resources. As part of this project, the government has poured millions into Xinjiang.<\/p>\n While Xinjiang has become significantly more prosperous and modern in the last decade, the development programs have only widened the divide between Han Chinese and the Uyghur. The jobs created from this new economic boom have been filled by Han Chinese immigrants from the east looking for opportunity. These immigrants have reaped much of the benefit from the development, fostering Uyghur resentment against the state.<\/p>\n With this context in mind, the Urumqi riots of 2009 cannot, by any means, be attributed to Islam. The Urumqi Uyghur gathered to protest authorities\u2019 inadequate response to a reported attack on Uyghur factory workers carried out by Han Chinese workers. The protest quickly became a call for equal economic opportunity. No manifestation of Islamic extremism, the riots were the cry of an oppressed, destitute people.<\/p>\n Xi\u2019s platform of creating a unified China with equal economic opportunity could solve the violence in Xinjiang. If he manages to foster inclusion in Xinjiang to help the Uyghur transcend their current economic reality, he might well be on his way to ushering in a new era of Chinese leadership.<\/p>\n Rachel Benaim <\/em>is a freelance journalist based in New York.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The indigenous Muslim minority group in China\u2019s western region, Xinjiang, may have a new champion in Beijing. 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May 29, 2014<\/p>\n